



What's in a pipe? Transnational negotiation of a 'strategic' item

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Druzhba, the Friendship pipeline

U.R.S.S. - OLÉODUCS PRINCIPAUX VERS L'OUEST



October 1960, ENI-SNE agreement



Enrico Mattei, president of ENI, shaking hands with Nikolai Palotichev, Soviet Foreign Minister: 12 million tons of crude oil to ENI in exchange for synthetic rubber, pipes and pipeline machineries

NATO Study Group on Soviet Oil Policy

European countries' policy vis-à-vis the Soviets needs regulation

Close collaboration between NATO national delegations and their respective oil companies

US delegation proposes embargo on large-diameter pipes so as to delay construction of *Druzhba*



Embargo!

Summer 1962: British contrariety leads to Econad-Council stalemate

A group of experts is summoned: member countries, "under their own responsibility", should stop deliveries of large diameter pipe to the Soviet bloc, and prevent new contracts

November: embargo approved, but won't apply to UK



Anglo-American confrontation



What's in a pipe?

UK: Oil pipes are strategic, gas pipes aren't as much. But the two can't be distinguished, so the Americans lump the two and make it look like the Soviets need more than they actually do, thus magnifying importance of foreign imports. Instead their needs in oil pipes are lower

Conclusions

Economic vs. military considerations: priority of security over trade relations

Military reasons to be accepted at face value?
The weight of oil companies in the embargo debate

A battle over figures and technological estimates:
gas vs. oil pipes, Soviet production capacities and needs, delays

